 On Friday, 3rd of May, we will be joined by Daniela Dover (University of Oxford), for our final Law and Philosophy Network seminar of the academic year. She will speak on the following topic:
Abstract This paper begins by introducing Beauvoirian moral psychology through its key concepts: ambiguity, project, situation, anxiety, justification, natural freedom, and moral freedom. It goes on to show how Beauvoir derives substantive ethical conclusions from her portrait of the human psyche. In its most general form, the Beauvoirian ‘existential imperative’ holds that, on pain of unmitigated anxiety, each human being must will freedom absolutely—‘the man who seeks to justify his life must will freedom itself, first of all and absolutely’ (Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté [Gallimard 1947], 34-35). Echoing Kant, whose categorical imperative can be stated in three ways that are ultimately, but not obviously, equivalent, we distinguish among what we call three ‘formulations’ of this imperative, each of which corresponds to a step in Beauvoir’s overall argument. Beauvoir begins by arguing that each of us must will our own freedom. Next, she argues that each of us must will the freedom of at least some others. Finally, she holds that each of us must will the freedom of all. This in turn requires political action.  The 2024 Adam Smith Lecture in Jurisprudence will be delivered by in Glasgow by Professor Martin Krygier, of the University of New South Wales, on Monday, 10th June 2024.
Abstract: According to Laurent Pech, the rule of law was described as a “‘buzzword’ by [Hungary’s] justice minister; a fiction by a Fidesz MP; and a ‘magic word’ by the FideszKDNP Delegation to the European Parliament. Not to be undone, a judge from Hungary’s (captured) constitutional court, has presented the rule of law ‘as a normative yardstick’ which is little more than an empty nineteenth century ideal and a political joker [sic] for all purposes.” In contrast, the English historian, E.P. Thompson, controversially called the rule of law ‘a cultural achievement of universal significance.’ With some small amendments, Krygier will agree with Thompson. Each word in that encomium, he will seek to demonstrate, deserves emphasis and respect. However, he will argue, it makes a huge difference what one takes the rule of law to be about. What is universal is the notion and realisation of a state of affairs in which power is reliably tempered, with the aid of law, so as not to be available for arbitrary abuse. It is that which is a cultural achievement of universal significance. It is a mistake to identify it, as so many do, with any allegedly canonical arrangement of forms and institutions and rules that are enlisted or assumed to embody it. Many people make that mistake. Some do so, because they naively think that installation of familiar institutions they associate with ‘the rule of law’ is the same as achieving the ideal itself. The disappointing history of rule of law promotion around the world shows that is not the case. On the other hand, modern illiberal, often populist, regimes are happy to endorse such a mistake and pretend that they are committed to the ideal by making a show of conformity to legal forms, while systematically subverting and abusing the rule of law itself. If criticised, they claim their cultural, constitutional, identity is under attack. Both the naïve and the malicious interpretations should be rejected. This will be followed by a workshop on Prof Krygier's book Phillip Selznick: Ideals in the World and the themes developed therein, which will be held on Tuesday, 11th June.  Glasgow Legal Theory are delighted announce that the 14th Annual Jurisprudence public lecture will be held at the University of Glasgow on the 19th June.
This year's lecture, coordinated by Taylor and Francis and the editorial board of Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought, will be delivered by Miranda Fricker of NYU. Abstract: Foucault famously traced the history of a form of testimony he labelled ‘avowal’ (aveu)—effectively a social institution of testimony that counts, necessarily, as true. Looking to the present, I will focus on two institutions of testimony, each of which forms part of a system of procedures of criminal justice—one in the UK and the other in the US—and I will analyse them as present-day institutional constructions of avowal. Each practice involves a highly problematic degree of testimonial extraction under unequal power, one ostensibly a technique of investigation, the other ostensibly a technique of rehabilitation. I will offer an analysis of the ethical and epistemic dysfunctionalities of each, and tentatively question whether there is any place for avowal in just institutional processes. |
